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Bringing Comfort to the Enemy?: The
Past, Present, and Future of Habeas
Corpus Petitions in Light of the
Formalistic Application
of Boumediene
E. Carlisle Overbey'
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to
the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only
with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise
more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very ene-
mies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his
own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the
result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.'
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Introduction
In Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in 1950, the Court worried about
the extraterritorial application of the right to petition for habeas corpus.2
Yet, since then, technology and thinking have evolved such that the Court
has begun to reconsider its approach.3 Starting in 2004, the Supreme
Court considered a line of cases leading up to its 2008 decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, which applied the Suspension Clause outside of the de
jure sovereign territory of the United States.4 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
Court held that the executive branch had the power to detain enemy com-
batants under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). 5
Next, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court allowed the extension of the writ of
habeas corpus to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.6 In Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, an alien-detainee held at Guantanamo Bay challenged the trial of
enemy combatants through military commissions, and the court held that
the military commissions as structured were inconsistent with the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 7 Finally, in Boumediene v. Bush, the
Court held that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied to Guan-
tanamo Bay, thus rendering attempts by Congress and the Executive
Branch to limit the applicability of the writ of habeas corpus to the base
unconstitutional unless they conformed to the stringent requirements of
the Suspension Clause.8 This decision allowed enemy combatants held at
Guantanamo Bay to petition U.S. courts for habeas corpus. 9
Since the passage of Boumediene, the lower federal courts have
received petitions asking the Court to extend the writ beyond the confines
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
4. Id. at 798.
5. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
6. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
7. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634.
8. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 793.
9. Id.
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of Guantanamo Bay. Recently, in 2009, the District Court for the District
of Columbia dismissed a petition for habeas corpus in Wazir v. Gates.10
Because the petitioner was an Afghan citizen, and the court was concerned
with the potential conflicts with the Afghan government over the trial of an
Afghan citizen in U.S. courts, the court refused to permit the petition to be
heard." After the District of Columbia District Court in Al Maqaleh v.
Gates (Al Maqaleh I) initially held that Bagram detainees could petition for
habeas corpus, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II) refused to extend the Suspension Clause
to detainees held at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, ordering that the peti-
tions should be dismissed in 2010.12 After a hearing in July 2012, the
District Court dismissed the petitions in Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh
III), finding that new evidence did not undermine the D.C. Circuit Court's
decision. 13 In October of 2012, the District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed a petition of a Pakistani citizen held at Bagram Air-
field in Hamidullah v. Obama.14 Hamidullah argued that he was fourteen
at the time he was captured; however, the court found that Hamidullah had
not sufficiently proven that habeas corpus protections for juveniles "[are]
somewhat more robust than the concomitant right among adults."' 5
Finally, in Amanatullah v. Obama, the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a Pakistani citizen detained at Bagram did not have the
right to petition the court for habeas corpus relief despite his arguments
that conditions at Bagram had changed since the court considered Al
Maqaleh 111.16
This Note argues that the current regime for habeas corpus petitions is
flawed because the test laid out by the Court in Boumediene has been
applied formalistically, ignoring its functional roots in the early detainee
cases. Further, this Note argues that other factors may become relevant to
the analysis beyond the three factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in
Boumediene. Given the complicated nature of the problem, and the individ-
ualized situations of the defendants, the courts should use a more function-
alist approach when enemy detainees under unique or altered conditions
petition the court for the writ of habeas corpus, which would be more in
line with the earlier habeas precedent and avoid the pitfalls associated with
formalistic rules. For example, because the courts have applied the
Boumediene factors formalistically, the United States government has the
incentive to continue to transfer detainees away from locations where the
writ has been extended.
This Note will first examine the background of habeas corpus in
America, through recent case law denying the extension of the writ of
10. Wazir v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d 63, 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
11. Id. (citing Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh 1), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 229 (D.D.C.
2009)).
12. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
13. Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh Ill), 899 F. Supp. 2d 10, 13 (D.D.C. 2012).
14. Hamidullah v. Obama, 899 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2012).
15. Id. at 7.
16. Amanatullah v. Obama, 904 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2012).
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habeas corpus to enemy detainees held on Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.
Second, it will examine whether the current habeas corpus regime is desir-
able by parsing out the problems with the D.C. Circuit Court's reasoning in
the recent case of Al Maqaleh II. Third, this Note will examine other fac-
tors, in addition to the Boumediene factors, that may become relevant to the
future of habeas corpus jurisprudence, including executive manipulation,
conflicts with host governments, the United States' withdrawal from
Afghanistan, and the age of the enemy combatants.
I. Background
A. The Historical Right to Habeas Corpus
Imported from English Common Law, the writ of habeas corpus pre-
vents the government from detaining individuals indefinitely without
showing cause. 1 ' The right to petition for habeas corpus in American
jurisprudence comes from the Suspension Clause of the Constitution,
which states, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety
may require it."' The writ of habeas corpus, known to the Founders as
the Great Writ, was included in the Constitution because it was crucial to
the Founders' vision for separation of powers, especially with concerns
that the various branches of government would trample the protections of
the writ in emergency circumstances.19 To preserve the separation of pow-
ers, the language of the Suspension Clause allows the courts to review arbi-
trary imprisonments. 20 Furthermore, owing to its importance to the
Founding Fathers, the writ was included in the Judiciary Act of 1789 in
addition to its inclusion in the Constitution.2' In its modern form, habeas
17. See JUDITH FARBEY & RJ. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 16-17 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2011) (discussing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which marks the
beginning of modern habeas jurisprudence in Common Law).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For a discussion of the English origins of habeas
corpus, see FARBEY & SHARPE, supra note 17.
19. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IowA L. REv. 445, 461-62 (2010) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
739-44 (2008)).
20. Id. at 462.
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 § 14, ("That writs of habeas corpus shall
in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by
colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court
of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify."). For a Founding
Father's views on Habeas Corpus, see THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1801), in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 148 (Barbara B. Odberg & J. Jefferson
Looney, eds. Univ. of Virginia Press, 2008), available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.
edu/founders/TSJN-01-33-02-0116-0004 (enumerating the principles, including habeas
corpus, that "form the bright constellation, which has gone before us and guided our
steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages, and blood
of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment: -they should be the creed of our
political faith; the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of
those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us
hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty and
safety.").
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petitions are limited to a small category of individuals.22
B. Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants
Before September 11, 2001, habeas law was primarily limited to crimi-
nal law and immigration cases; however, after the attacks, Congress passed
the AUMF. 23 This joint resolution allowed the President to use "necessary
and appropriate force" against those involved in the September 11th
attacks and those who would "harbor" the individuals involved.24 Under
this resolution, President George W. Bush authorized the indefinite deten-
tion of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.25
1. The Path to Boumediene v. Bush
It was not long before President Bush's indefinite detention authoriza-
tion was challenged in the courts. In this first line of cases, including
Hamdi v. Bush, Rasul v. Bush, and Hamdan v. Bush, the Court was careful to
emphasize that the Executive Branch was not entitled to unfettered discre-
tion to detain enemy combatants, despite the wartime conditions.26 How-
ever, the Court has been more deferential to the Executive when an act of
Congress supported the action.27 Applying a functionalist approach, the
Court has created a consistent line of cases that limits the discretion of the
Executive Branch.28
In Hamdi v. Bush, the Court held that Congress, through the AUMF,
authorized the detention of enemy combatants. 29 The Act allows the Presi-
dent to employ "all necessary and appropriate force" against those involved
in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. 30 Because Hamdi
was an American citizen, the Court also noted that a citizen-detainee was
entitled to "a factual basis for his classification," and a "fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision
maker."3 ' Though deferential to the Executive, the Court factored in the
Congressional support for the Executive's power and was careful to pre-
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)-(5) (2008). Habeas corpus petitions are only available to
those who are in custody of the United States.
23. Ashley E. Siegel, Note, Some Holds Barred: Extending Executive Detention Habeas
Law Beyond Guantanamo Bay, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2012).
24. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
25. Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, § 2(a)(1), 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1665, 1666 (Nov. 13,
2001) (authorizing the indefinite detention of terrorists without trials, instead authoriz-
ing the use of military commissions); News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of
Defense (Dec. 27, 2001), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx/?transcriptid=2696 (indicating that these enemy combatants would be held at
Guantanamo Bay).
26. Azmy, supra note 19, at 452.
27. Id. at 453-54.
28. Id. at 452.
29. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
30. Id. at 518.
31. Id. at 533.
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serve the citizen-detainee's rights to an opportunity to be heard.32
Rasul v. Bush was the first case to hold that Guantanamo Bay detainees
could petition United States courts under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas
corpus relief.33 The Court found that Guantanamo Bay was de facto U.S.
territory, because the U.S. had "complete jurisdiction and control" over the
area.34 However, the Court was not clear as to whether the right to petition
for habeas corpus relief was exclusive to the specific conditions of Guanta-
namo Bay, or if the decision was meant to reach beyond Guantanamo Bay
to places where the United States had less control.35 Justice Scalia, in his
dissent, worried that this would mean the right to petition for habeas
corpus relief would extend to the "four corners of the earth."36
Finally, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, an alien-detainee held at Guantanamo
Bay challenged President Bush's November 2001 Executive Order concern-
ing the trial of enemy combatants through military commissions.37
Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured in Afghanistan and then
detained at Guantanamo Bay.3 The Court held that the military commis-
sions authorized by the AUMF were inconsistent with the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) because the procedures of the military commis-
sions were not consistent with those required for formal courts-martial.39
Because the President did not have the authorization from Congress, the
Court was less deferential to the Executive Branch than it had been in other
decisions. In his concurrence, Justice Steven Breyer suggested that the
Executive Branch return and get Congressional authority for the military
commissions. 40
2. A Functionalist View in Boumediene v. Bush
Following the advice of Justice Breyer, President Bush returned to Con-
gress for authorization to create military commissions for enemy combat-
ants. Congress authorized these commissions in the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), expressly providing for the procedural
variances from the UCMJ. Attempting to remedy the separation of power
defects found by the Court in Hamdan, the MCA attempted to statutorily
remove access to the writ of habeas corpus.4 '
The MCA created a new scheme for review of the enemy combatant
designation, whereby the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT),
would determine whether an alien was appropriately classified as an
enemy combatant. This decision would then be reviewable exclusively by
32. Azmy, supra note 19, at 460.
33. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
34. Id. at 480.
35. Id.; see Azmy, supra note 19, at 456 (noting that the opinion does not define the
geographical boundaries of its decision).
36. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. See Azmy, supra note 19, at 457.
38. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006).
39. Id. at 594, 620-23.
40. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
41. Siegel, supra note 23, at 1413.
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the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.42 The CSRT would hold
non-adversarial proceedings to determine if the Department of Defense's
determination that an individual should be detained was accurate. 43 The
Court of Appeals could only review whether the determination of the
CSRT's decision was "consistent with the standards and procedures speci-
fied by the Secretary of Defense"; or whether the procedures were constitu-
tional and consistent with the laws of the United States to "the extent that
the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable."44
For the first time in the history of wartime Court decisions, in
Boumediene the Court held a statute with both Congressional and Execu-
tive support-the MCA-unconstitutional.45 In Boumediene, concerned
that the Executive might try to manipulate any bright-line rules, the Court
employed a functionalist approach to determine whether the habeas right
still reached Guantanamo Bay after the enactment of the MCA. The detain-
ees claimed that the removal of the privilege of habeas corpus through the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the MCA was unconstitutional
because the privilege could not be removed unless through the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution.46
a. The Historical Reach of the Writ
In order to determine the geographic extent of the writ of habeas
corpus, Justice Anthony Kennedy explored the scope of the common law
writ as it stood in 1789.47 Although not dispositive, at the urging of the
petitioners the Court also considered English common law precedent
allowing aliens to petition for habeas corpus relief.48 Further, petitioners
argued that their position at Guantanamo Bay was analogous to territories
where the writ ran outside of England, namely the Channel Islands and
India.49 However, the Court distinguished these two "exempt jurisdic-
tions," asserting that they were under the Crown's control, and some
authority states that these jurisdictions were considered part of the sover-
eign territory of Britain.50 Furthermore, there was a court sitting in Cal-
cutta, whereas there is no federal court that currently sits in Guantanamo
42. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006),
H§ 948d(c), 950d(d) (codified as 10 U.S.C. 948a note) (explaining the scheme revived
by the Military Court Act of 2006 after its nullification in Hamdan).
43. Azmy, supra note 19, at 459-60 (citing Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Dep-
uty Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal 1 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2004
0707review.pdf).
44. Military Commissions Act § 950g(c).
45. Azmy, supra note 19, at 460.
46. Siegel, supra note 23, at 1414.
47. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746-52 (2008).
48. Id. at 747 (citing Case of Three Spanish Sailors, 2 Black. W. 1324, 96 Eng. Rep.
775 (C. P. 1779); Sommersett's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80-82 (1772); King v. Schiever,
2 Burr. 765, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K. B. 1759); Du Castro's Case, Fort. 195, 92 Eng. Rep.
816 (K. B. 1697)).
49. Id. at 748.
50. Id.
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Bay. 5'
On the other side, the Government argued that Guantanamo was more
like Scotland and Hanover, which were not part of England, but were under
the control of the English monarch.52 The writ did not extend over these
territories, despite the monarch's control in his capacities as the King of
Scotland and Elector of Hanover.53 However, Justice Kennedy attributed
this to prudential concerns, rather than to an inability of the courts to
apply the writ to these territories.54 Because Scotland maintained its own
laws and court system after its unification with Britain, it could have been
problematic for English courts to apply the writ in the territory, as it could
have led to inconsistent judgments in competent courts and difficulty in
enforcement.55 Justice Kennedy, however, noted that neither of these
potential embarrassments would extend to Guantanamo, as there was not
another competent court system for the naval base there, and an order from
a United States Court would not likely be disobeyed by the military.56
Despite the extensive common law history of the writ, Justice Kennedy
asserted that unclear precedent would not bind the Court, because Guanta-
namo was a unique location, and terrorism was a unique problem.57
Additionally, the sovereignty of Guantanamo presented unique consid-
erations. Guantanamo is not part of the United States, as Cuba maintains
"ultimate sovereignty" over the area, while the United States has de facto
control.58 The Court did not dispute the Government's assertions con-
cerning the sovereignty of Guantanamo; however, the Court did consider
the extent to which the United States objectively controlled the territory.59
In finding that de jure control was not required for the writ to extend to a
territory, the Court refused to defer to the Government's position, despite
the congruent support of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
b. Functionalist Approach in Precedent
Because the common law history was inconclusive, the Court consid-
ered various precedents to support its conclusion that the Suspension
Clause applied to Guantanamo, and its functionalist approach.60 In the
Insular Cases, heard between 1901 and 1905, the Court held that the Con-
stitution applied to territories that were not States, but recognized that
there were intrinsic difficulties in adopting this approach. 61 The Court
held that the Constitution applied in full to incorporated territories, but
51. Id. at 748-49.
52. Id. at 749.
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 749 (2008).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 749-50.
56. Id. at 751.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 753.
59. Id. at 753-54 (2008).
60. Azmy, supra note 19, at 464.
61. Boumediene 553 U.S. at 757 (2008).
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only in part to unincorporated territories. 62 The Court used a flexible
approach to Constitutional applicability in territories throughout the Insu-
lar Cases, which would inform its approach in Boumediene; where it sought
to use "its power sparingly and where it would be most needed."63
Kennedy also considered Reid v. Covert, heard in 1957 by the Supreme
Court, in which military spouses were charged and tried before military
commissions abroad for crimes committed abroad. 64 Because they were
not military members, they argued that they were entitled to a jury trial.65
The Court determined in Reid that the "specific circumstances of each par-
ticular case" were important for determining the territorial reach of the
Constitution, implicating a functionalist approach.66 The American citi-
zenship of the defendants was critical to the holding that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment applied abroad, with each of the Justices noting the addi-
tional importance of practical considerations. 67
The final precedent considered by the Court, Johnson v. Eisentrager,
decided in 1950, was also decided on practical considerations. 68 In Eisen-
trager, the Court considered the habeas petitions of several enemy aliens
who were convicted of violating the laws of war and detained at Landsberg
Prison in Germany. 69 Concerned with the practical problems of requiring
the government to bring the prisoners into court for a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, the Court balanced these considerations with the requirements of
the Constitution. 70 Citing the "allocation of shipping space, guarding per-
sonnel, billeting and rations"7 ' and that it would be detrimental to the
commanders "prestige ... at a sensitive time", the Court refused to allow
the prisoners to bring habeas petitions.72 The Court in Eisentrager stated
that the prisoners "at no relevant time were within any territory over which
the United States is sovereign, and [that] the scenes of their offense, their
capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any court of the United States."73 However, the Court in
Boumediene reasoned that this did not require the Court to apply a formal-
istic approach that hinged purely on de jure sovereignty.74
From this precedent, the Court extracted a line of reasoning that was
consistent throughout the Insular Cases, Reid, and Eisentrager: the applica-
bility of the Constitution in extraterritorial cases hinges on a functional
analysis rather than a formal one.7 5 Applying this approach to Boumediene,
62. Id. at 757-58 (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904)).
63. Id. at 759.
64. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1957).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 760.
68. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950).
69. Id. at 766.
70. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762.
71. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
72. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762.
73. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778.
74. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763.
75. Id. at 764.
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the Court refused to take the Government's position that de jure sover-
eignty created a bright-line rule for the extraterritorial application of the
Suspension Clause. 76
c. Separation of Powers
Furthermore, the Court in Boumediene was concerned that the dejure
requirement for Constitutional application would tempt the Government to
create areas where the law did not apply, at least to non-citizens.77 In
1898, Spain ceded Cuba to the United States at the end of the Spanish-
American War, and the United States maintained de jure sovereignty over
Cuba until 1902.78. In 1903, the United States entered into a lease giving
Cuba "ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo Bay, but allowing the United
States to exercise the same absolute power over the territory that it had
held since the end of the Spanish-American War.7 9 If the Government
could replicate this arrangement in other regions of the world, the Govern-
ment would be able to create havens where the Constitution would not
apply."o
The Court reasoned that the Constitution cannot be "contracted away"
in that manner, and that allowing such an arrangement would permit the
political branches of government to determine what the law is and where it
applies.8 ' Concerned that the applicability of the Suspension Clause
would be "subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to
restrain," the Court noted that separation of powers concerns weighed
against a formalist approach.82
d. The Boumediene Factors
In taking a functionalist approach, the Court enumerated several fac-
tors to weigh when considering whether the Suspension Clause should
apply to Guantanamo Bay.83 The Court in Boumediene adapted three fac-
tors from the practical concerns outlined in Eisentrager, and held that at a
minimum these three factors were relevant to the determination of Consti-
tutional applicability of the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo Bay: "(1)
the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practi-
cal obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."8 4
In Eisentrager, the detainees were not American citizens, and did not
contest that they were enemy aliens.8 5 However, in Boumediene, the detain-
76. Id. at 764-65.
77. Id. at 765.
78. Id. at 764.
79. Id. at 765.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 766.
83. Id. at 766-71.
84. Id. at 766.
85. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950).
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ees, though still not American citizens, did claim that they were not enemy
combatants.86 Through the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT)
proceedings, the court noted that the detainees had some process to deter-
mine their status, but also stated that unlike the prisoners in Eisentrager,
these detainees had not yet been tried before formal military commis-
sions.87 Holding that the procedures afforded to the Boumediene detainees
fell short of those that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review,
the Court noted that the detainees were not charged with specific crimes,
represented by counsel or even an advocate, allowed to introduce evidence
that was not "reasonably available", and were not able to effectively rebut
the government's evidence against them without the aid of counsel. 8
Like the prisoners in Eisentrager, the Boumediene detainees were not
held or apprehended inside the sovereign territory of the United States.89
However, the Court noted several important distinctions that weighed in
favor of the applicability of the Suspension Clause. Unlike Landsberg
Prison in 1950, Guantanamo is under the absolute and indefinite control
of the United States.90 Landsberg Prison was instead under the combined
jurisdiction of the Allied Forces, and hence, the other forces scrutinized the
United States' actions in the prison.9' Further, the Allies did not intend to
occupy Germany for an extended period, nor did they intend to completely
replace the already-existing German infrastructure.92 Because Guanta-
namo Bay has been consistently held by the United States, the Boumediene
Court found that the second factor weighed in favor of extending habeas
corpus rights to detainees at Guantanamo.93
The Court found that the final factor, the practical obstacles inherent
in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ, also weighed in favor of
the detainees. 94 Despite recognizing that habeas corpus proceedings
would necessarily require funds and the diversion of some military person-
nel, the Court found that these factors were not dispositive.95 Additionally,
the habeas corpus proceedings would not compromise the military mission
at Guantanamo. 96 The Court distinguished Eisentrager by noting that the
military mission in Germany was responsible for occupying a huge terri-
tory with eighteen million people after the end of the war.97 The military,
stationed in Germany, "[iun addition to supervising massive reconstruction
and aid efforts[,] . . . faced potential security threats from a defeated
enemy."98 Unlike the military presence in post-war Germany, the military
86. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
87. Id. at 765-66.
88. Id. at 767.
89. Id. at 768.
90. id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 768-69.
94. Id. at 769.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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stationed at Guantanamo occupies only forty-five square miles of land and
water and is not in an active theater of war.99 Finally, the Court noted that
adjudicating habeas petitions in Guantanamo would not cause conflicts
with the host government. 00
With all three factors weighing in favor of extending habeas corpus
rights to detainees, the Court held that the Suspension Clause applied to
Guantanamo Bay. Thus, if Congress wished to remove habeas corpus
rights from those detainees, they would have to do so under the terms of
the Suspension Clause, and only "in cases of rebellion or invasion
[when] the public safety may require it."' 0 '
3. Rigid Misapplication of Boumediene in Al Maqaleh II
a. History of Detention of Enemy Combatants at Bagram Air Base
As of 2009, Bagram Airfield, located forty miles outside of Kabul in
Afghanistan,102 held more than six hundred prisoners. 03 Additionally,
the site is a base for American forces, along with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF),
which constitute the coalition forces in the region.' 04 The United States
military has controlled Bagram Airfield since the invasion of Afghanistan
in 2001.105 Soon after taking over the base, the military converted airplane
hangars into detention facilities, which would ultimately be known as the
Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF).106 The BTIF is under the
exclusive control of the U.S. military.107 In 2006, the U.S. and Afghanistan
signed a lease agreement granting the U.S. the "exclusive, peaceable, undis-
turbed and uninterrupted" use of the land.' 08 Though Afghanistan is still
the "host" nation, the lease agreement allows the United States use of the
airfield until the U.S. or its successors determine that the base is no longer
needed. 109
b. Petitioners
Four defendants originally petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in Al
Maqaleh 1.110 The District Court deferred and ultimately dismissed the
complaint of an Afghan citizen detainee because of sovereignty concerns
99. Id. at 770.
100. Id.
101. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
102. Azmy, supra note 19, at 483.
103. Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Govern-
ment, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 851, 857 (2010).
104. Azmy, supra note 19, at 483.
105. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 103, at 856.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Lands and Facilities at Bagram
Airfield, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 28, 2006, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/01/miller-declarationl.pdf. (attached as Exhibit I to Declaration
of Colonel Rose M. Miller, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707 (D.D.C. 2006)).
109. Id.
110. Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.D.C. 2009).
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and practical concerns that this would cause conflict with the Afghan gov-
ernment. 111 Haji Wazir, the Afghan citizen, was captured in Dubai in
2002.112 After denying the government's motion to dismiss on the other
three cases, the District Court certified these cases for interlocutory
appeal.' 1 3 The Circuit Court reviewed the cases of Fadi Al-Maqaleh, a
Yemeni citizen allegedly held since 2003 whose site of capture is
unclear,114 Redha Al-Najar, a Tunisian citizen allegedly captured in Paki-
stan in 2002, and Amin Al-Bakri, a Yemeni citizen allegedly captured in
Thailand in 2002.115
c. Boumediene Factors
The court in Al Maqaleh II examined the three Boumediene factors to
determine whether the Suspension Clause applied to Bagram Airfield. The
court first considered "the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made."11 6 Though the court determined that citizenship was important to
determining the constitutional rights of persons, the alien citizenship of
the petitioners in this case did not weigh against the petitioners, because
their citizenship did not differ from the petitioners in Boumediene.1"7
Despite their standing as enemy aliens, the court found that this factor
weighed in favor of extending the writ to Bagram detainees.118
Further, the court found that the process afforded to the Bagram
detainees was less than the CSRT proceeding provided to Guantanamo
detainees." 9 The Al Maqaleh I petitioners' status was determined by an
"Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board" (UECRB), which afforded
fewer protections than a CSRT proceeding.120 Though the exact details of
UECRB procedures have not been disclosed, the detainees in this case were
only entitled to the "general basis of [their] detention," and were only
allowed to make a written statement in response to the allegations.121
Finding these procedures even less protective of detainee rights than those
in Boumediene, the court held that the first factor weighed heavily towards
extending the writ to the Bagram detainees.122
111. Id. at 230-31, overruled on other grounds by Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Wazir v. Gates, 629 F.Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.D.C. 2009).
112. Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
113. Al Maqaleh 11, 605 F.3d at 87.
114. Although Al-Maqaleh claimed he was captured outside of Afghanistan, Colonel
James W. Gray, the Commander of Detention Operations, asserted that Al-Maqaleh was
captured in Zabul, Afghanistan. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 94 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008)).
117. Id. at 95-96.
118. Id. at 96.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 96.
121. While the case was pending in front of the Circuit Court, the Obama administra-
tion implemented enhanced protocol for the UECRB which allowed the prisoners to
appear before the board; however, lawyers are still not allowed to participate in the hear-
ings. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 103, at 862.
122. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96.
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The second Boumediene factor, "the nature of the sites where apprehen-
sion and then detention took place," on the other hand, weighed heavily in
favor of the United States. 123 Like the petitioners in Boumediene (and in
Eisentrager), the Al Maqaleh II petitioners were apprehended abroad.' 24
The nature of the site where detention took place weighed favorably
towards the Government's position because of the significant distinctions
between the leasehold on Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Airfield.125 Addi-
tionally, because the United States has maintained control over Guanta-
namo for over a century and there is no evidence that the United States
intends its presence at Bagram to be permanent, the court held that there
was no de facto sovereignty over Bagram, unlike the United States' de facto
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.126 Furthermore, because the United
States has maintained Guantanamo in the face of a hostile government,
whereas the Afghan government is not hostile to the United States, the
court held that the site of detention weighed heavily in favor of denying the
extension of the writ to Bagram detainees.' 27
Finally, the court held that the third factor, "the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ," weighed heav-
ily in favor of the position of the United States.128 Because Afghanistan
was an active theater of war, the court held that the case was more like
Eisentrager than Boumediene and was ultimately a stronger case for denying
the writ than the case in Eisentrager.129 Though World War II had ended
by the time the petitioners in Eisentrager brought their habeas corpus peti-
tion, the United States and the Allied forces were rebuilding Germany and
still faced threats from the defeated enemies.130 The Court was "con-
cerned about judicial interference with the military's efforts . . . ."131 In
Afghanistan, the court held that the threats were even greater because
Bagram Airfield is in an active theater of war.132 Weighing all of these
factors, the court held that the second and third factors outweighed the
first factor, and ultimately did not extend the Suspension Clause to Bagram
Airfield.13 3
II. Analysis
A. Is the Current Regime Desirable?
Though Al Maqaleh II left open the possibility of additional factors, the
court still used a formalistic approach in applying the Boumediene factors
123. Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 97.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766).
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784).
131. Id. (quoting id.).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 99.
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that seems contrary to the overall theme of the detention precedent.134
The precedent supports the idea that the habeas corpus problem requires a
functionalist approach, yet the current regime is rigid in its application of
the Boumediene factors. This Note argues that a continued formalistic
application of the factors is not desirable, particularly as the situation in
Afghanistan evolves and the United States pulls back on its involvement.
1. The Government's Interest in a Formalistic Approach
The government has an interest in seeing courts apply the formalistic
approach the D.C. Circuit Court used in Al Maqaleh II by applying the
Boumediene factors. With this approach, the government is able to keep the
detainees outside of the reach of the writ of habeas corpus, without the
threat of review of their actions in court. If the analysis is limited to the
Boumediene factors, only something as extreme as an end to the War
Against Terror would likely change the outcome of habeas corpus petition
cases before the courts, and the government would likely be willing to
release detainees after the end of the war in order to comply with interna-
tional laws of war. The status of the site of detention is not likely to change
in a way that would make the factor weigh towards allowing detainees to
petition for the writ. The fact that the Afghan Government is becoming
increasingly hostile to the United States' control of the prison is more likely
to weigh in favor of the United States than the detainees because it makes
the United States' position more tenuous.' 3 5 Many of the detainees have
been handed over to the Afghan government and would then be even fur-
ther outside the reach of habeas corpus rights in American courts.13 6 If
courts continue to apply the Boumediene factors in a formalistic manner,
the government will not have much trouble keeping Bagram detainees and
other enemy combatant petitioners from having the right to petition for
habeas corpus relief and will effectively be able to decide where the Consti-
tution applies.
2. Separation of Powers
While the government's position is that the courts should defer to the
Executive on matters of war-making powers, the writ of habeas corpus was
intended to protect against unbridled power accumulated by an executive
in times of war.137 In Boumediene, the Court stated that the writ of habeas
corpus was fundamental to the framers, because it meant "that the King,
too, was subject to the law."138 The writ was intended as a judicial check
on the power of the Executive to detain individuals indefinitely in times of
war. 139
134. Id. at 95-99.
135. See Rob Nordland, Issues Linger as Afghans Take Control of a Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2012, at A5.
136. Id.
137. Azmy, supra note 19, at 461.
138. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 741 (2008).
139. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
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But a formalistic application of the Boumediene factors subverts the
concerns that led to the inclusion of the writ in the Constitution. As dis-
cussed further below, the formalist approach leaves open the possibility
that the Executive will manipulate the system and make decisions on where
to detain individuals in order to avoid court intervention. The Supreme
Court in Boumediene expressed its concern with this in stating, "[o]ur basic
charter cannot be contracted away like this."' 40 The current regime essen-
tially encourages the government to do just that. Since the Supreme Court
handed down the Boumediene decision, transfers to Guantanamo Bay have
abruptly halted.141
3. Al Maqaleh 1: Was the Outcome in Al Maqaleh II and III Certain?
When Judge Bates of the D.C. District Court first applied the
Boumediene factors in Al Maqaleh I he initially reached a different result,
indicating that the outcome in Al Maqaleh II was neither certain nor man-
dated by the result of Boumediene. It was only upon review by the D.C.
Circuit, and remand to the D.C. District Court, that the Boumediene factors
were applied rigidly and formalistically. The court divided the three
Boumediene factors into six factors to analyze the petitioners case in Al
Maqaleh 1: "(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the
detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status deter-
mination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the
nature of the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the petitioner's entitlement to the writ."' 4 2 Refusing to apply a
wholesale approach to all Bagram detainees, Judge Bates wrote, "[t]he
Supreme Court repeatedly eschewed bright-line rules, favoring instead an
assessment of 'objective factors and practical concerns."'14 3 The D.C. Dis-
trict Court also highlighted a seventh factor that informed the Boumediene
analysis: "the length of a petitioner's detention without adequate
review."' 4 4
The court found that the petitioners were situated identically to the
petitioners in Boumediene regarding three of the factors: the citizenship of
the detainee (none of the petitioners were U.S. citizens); status of the
detainee (all contested their determination as "enemy combatants"); and
site of apprehension (all petitioners were apprehended outside of the U.S.
sovereign territory).1 45 The fact that none of the petitioners were American
citizens weighed against extending the writ to the petitioners.' 4 6 Addition-
ally, the court found that the status of the detainees as "enemy combat-
ants" weighed neither for nor against the extension of the writ.147 Finally,
the court found that the site of apprehension could be relevant, though the
140. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
141. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 103, at 856.
142. Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (D.D.C. 2009).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 216.
145. Id. at 217-18.
146. Id. at 218-19.
147. Id. at 219-20.
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court distinguished between Bagram detainees captured in Afghanistan
and those captured outside of Afghanistan but detained at Bagram.14 8 The
court found that under the holding of Boumediene, particularly the concern
with executive manipulation of any bright-line rules, there was a difference
between those detainees who were captured in a theater of war and
detained there and those detainees captured far from the battlefield and
then brought into an active theater of war.14 9 In this case, the court held
that this factor cut in favor of the detainees, because they were all appre-
hended outside of Afghanistan.150
For the next three factors, the court found that an analysis substan-
tially different from the Boumediene analysis applied.15 Firstly, the court
found that the site of detention revolved around the "objective degree of
control" that the United States exercised over Bagram Airbase.152 Finding
that the United States exercised a high "objective degree of control," and
that the allies at Landsberg prison in the Eisentrager case served as an
actual check on U.S. forces, while that was not the case at Bagram, the
court held that "[o]n the Guantanamo-Landsberg spectrum, then, the
objective degree of control the United States has at Bagram resembles U.S.
control at Guantanamo more closely than U.S. control at Landsberg."153
However, the court also found that "[als to the duration of the U.S. pres-
ence, . . . Bagram appears to be closer to Landsberg than Guantanamo-the
United States has been at Bagram for less than a decade and has disavowed
any intention of a permanent presence there."' 5 4 Ultimately, the court
concluded that as to the site of detention, the factor did not weigh as
strongly towards the petitioners as it did at Bagram, but that the United
States still "has a high objective degree of control at Bagram."' 5 5
Secondly, the court examined the adequacy of the process to deter-
mine the status of the detainees as enemy combatants.' 56 The court found
that the UECRB reviews of detainees at Bagram was less thorough than the
CSRT proceedings used for the Guantanamo detainees.' 5 7 The court
found that since the inadequacy of the CSRT proceedings weighed in favor
of the petitioners in Boumediene, the greater inadequacies of the UECRB
weighed even more strongly in favor of the Al Maqaleh I petitioners.' 5 8
Thirdly, the court considered the practical obstacles inherent in
extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram.159 In Boumediene, the Court
focused on whether extending habeas corpus to Guantanamo would com-
148. Id. at 220.
149. Id. at 220-21.
150. Id. at 221.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 225.
155. Id. at 225-26.
156. Id. at 226-27.
157. Id. at 226.
158. Id. at 227.
159. Id. at 227-31.
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promise active military missions or if it would cause friction with the host
government, finding that these considerations weighed in favor of
extending the writ to the petitioners.160 At Bagram, the practical difficul-
ties in providing habeas review to detainees are elevated because it is
located in an active war zone. 161 However, given the United States' control
over Bagram and advances in technology, these barriers are less than those
that confronted the military at Landsberg prison. 162 For example, the
court cited video-conferencing capabilities that could negate the need for
in-court appearances.16 3 Additionally, the court found that pulling wit-
nesses from the battlefield was not an issue because all of the petitioners
were captured outside of Afghanistan, and the difficulties in providing
attorneys were not dispositive.164 The court held that the practical obsta-
cles inherent in extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram were "not so
onerous, so fraught with danger, or so likely to cause friction with the
Afghan government as to warrant depriving them of the protections of the
Great Writ."l 65
Balancing all of the factors outlined above, the court in Al Maqaleh I
found that the Suspension Clause did extend to Bagram Airbase and that
the MCA § 7(a), which stripped the court of the jurisdiction to hear the
petitions, was unconstitutional.16 6 Finding that the Bagram detainees were
in many senses identical to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, the
court held that "there [was] a very close historical precedent-Boumediene
itself, which compel[led the] outcome."167 Additionally, the court found
that Congress had not provided an adequate substitute for habeas review,
as the process provided to Bagram detainees was even less than that pro-
vided to Guantanamo detainees, and even those CSRT proceedings did not
adequately substitute for habeas review. 168
Prior to the decision, scholars predicted that the writ would extend to
the prisoners at Bagram.1 69 Finding, as the court would, that the UECRB
procedures were even more deficient than the CSRT procedures used at
Guantanamo, Professors Falkoff and Knowles concurred with Judge Bates
in Al Maqaleh I-that the factor of the procedures used weighed in favor of
the petitioners-though they cautioned against putting too much weight on
this factor.1 70 They would have this factor, along with the next factor, the
site of capture and site of detention, only be relevant insofar as it reveals
160. Id. at 227-28.
161. Id. at 228.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 228-29.
165. Id. at 231.
166. Id. at 235. This applied only to three of the petitioners: al Maqaleh, al Bakri, and
al-Najar. The fourth petitioner, Haji Wazir, had his petition dismissed because he was
an Afghan citizen and because of concern over possible "friction with the Afghan gov-
ernment." Id. at 229
167. Id. at 232.
168. Id.
169. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 103, at 887.
170. Id. at 889-90.
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whether the government has exceeded the limitations on war-making'that
the Constitution authorizes.171 Falkoff and Knowles also found the next
factor, the site of capture and the site of detention, to weigh in favor of the
petitioners.1 72 They stated, "[It is reasonable to conclude that the govern-
ment is not acting within its authority when it seeks to deny access to the
courts to a detainee who was taken into custody outside of a war zone and
was subsequently brought into the war zone by the government."' 73
Finally, they examined the practical difficulties in extending the writ to
Bagram through a comparison of Bagram and Guantanamo Bay.' 74 Find-
ing, as Judge Bates did in Al Maqaleh I, that the degree of U.S. control over
Bagram was relevant, these scholars agreed that the practical obstacles
could be overcome, especially because many of the detainees had been
brought into the active war zone. 175 As they eloquently concluded, "[A]s
detentions lengthen, procedural protections are abandoned, the location of
the prisons becomes more secure, and access to the courts is made more
practicable, it becomes increasingly impossible to contend that the govern-
ment's refusal to allow access to the courts is reasonably related to its con-
stitutional authority to wage war."176
B. Future of Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence: Additional Factors May
Become Relevant
Additional factors could become relevant in the analysis of whether to
extend habeas corpus rights to petitioners from Bagram or other similarly
situated detainees. Boumediene, in its language, left open this possibility
when the Court stated, "at least three factors are relevant in determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause . . . ."177 Further, the D.C. Circuit Court
left open the possibility in Al Maqaleh II that other factors might result in a
change of position for petitioners from Bagram.178
1. Manipulation Principle
In Al Maqaleh II, the D.C. Circuit Court addressed, but dismissed, the
petitioners' claims that the U.S. Government was "evad[ing] judicial review
of Executive detention decisions by transferring detainees into active con-
flict zones, thereby granting the Executive the power to switch the Constitu-
tion on or off at will."17 9 The court stated that this was neither relevant to
the case nor to the second and third factors in Boumediene.180 However,
there is some compelling evidence to the contrary, and, additionally, it was
171. Id. at 890.
172. Id.
173. Id. (emphasis omitted).
174. Id. at 892-94.
175. Id. at 893.
176. Id. at 893-94.
177. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (emphasis added).
178. Al Maqaleh III, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307, 08-2143, 2012 WL 5077483, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2012).
179. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
180. Id.
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a concern that the Court worried about in Boumediene.181 There, the
Supreme Court stated unequivocally, "The test for determining the scope
of this provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose
power it is designed to restrain."l 82
In 2004, when it became more apparent that enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay would be allowed to petition U.S. Courts for the writ of
habeas corpus, transfers of detainees from Afghanistan and other locations
to Guantanamo largely stopped.' 83 Currently, there are approximately
3,000 people detained at Bagram, whereas there are about 170 detained at
Guantanamo Bay.' 84 Between early 2004, when the population of Bagram
was 100, and 2012, the population increased thirtyfold.185
If a petitioner were able to convince the court of the relevance of this
information, even if it were not relevant to the second and third factors in
Boumediene, as the court in Al Maqaleh II stated, it might constitute a factor
in its own right. Certainly, a desire to prevent detainees from being able to
petition for habeas corpus is not a legitimate interest in itself. Additionally,
this was a concern for the Court in Boumediene. The Court stated that a
bright line rule might become manipulable and worried that this would
allow the government to effectively decide where the law applied. 186 Fur-
ther, Chief Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit also explicitly recognized the
danger of allowing an executive to move detainees captured abroad into
active warzones to prevent them from having access to judicial review in Al
Maqaleh 11.187 These policy concerns seem applicable to a functional anal-
ysis of whether the writ should extend to enemy detainees held outside of
Guantanamo. An interest in ensuring that the Executive not undermine
separation of powers through detaining enemy combatants just outside the
reach of habeas corpus would weigh in favor of extending the writ to
enemy combatants held at Bagram Airbase.
2. Conflicts with "Host Governments"
Judge Bates, in Al Maqaleh I, discussed thoroughly how conflicts with
host governments would affect the analysis of the Boumediene factors. One
of the petitioners, Wazir, was an Afghan citizen, which complicated mat-
ters.' 88 According to the Tennison Declaration that Judge Bates cited in Al
Maqaleh I, "[Plursuant to a diplomatic arrangement reached with the gov-
181. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765-66.
182. Id.
183. Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 103, at 856.
184. Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram-air-base-
afghanistan/index.html?8qa (last visited Dec. 9, 2012),
185. Tim Golden, Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2008, at Al.
186. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765-66.
187. Al Maqaleh 11, 605 F.3d. 84, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But the Chief Judge
claimed that the executive would have had to foresee the outcome of Boumediene to "turn
off the Constitution." Id. at 99.
188. Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 230 (D.D.C. 2009).
420 Vol. 46
2013 Bringing Comfort to the Enemy
ernment of Afghanistan, a significant percentage of the Afghan detainees at
[Bagram] is expected to be transferred to the Government of Afghani-
stan."1'89 The Afghan government had already begun to accept transferees
from the American government and had renovated a prison to hold the
detainees.190 Judge Bates, concerned that "[flriction with the Afghan gov-
ernment could arise if a U.S. court were to entertain Afghan detainees'
habeas petitions," set Wazir's petition apart from the other three petition-
ers in Al Maqaleh L.191 Part of the concern was that U.S. courts should not
undermine the legal system already established in Afghanistan, and if a
U.S. court were to order an individual's release, they would be released
back into Afghanistan, which could upset the balance between the two
countries.1 92 Judge Bates deferred deciding whether to dismiss Wazir's
petition, and ultimately did in Wazir v. Gates.19 3 In doing so, he stated, "In
balancing the Boumediene factors, this possibility of friction was suffi-
ciently weighty to defeat Wazir's claim that he is entitled to invoke the
protections of the Suspension Clause."' 94
This factor, while it would often weigh in favor of the government, as it
mainly applies to Afghan citizens, is not without force when discussing
detainees alien to both the United States and Afghanistan. In Boumediene,
the Court noted that "[n]o Cuban court has jurisdiction over ... the enemy
combatants detained there. . . . [Tihe United States is, for all practical
purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base."' 95
However, in Afghanistan, even with respect to the detainees who are not
Afghan citizens, the U.S. is answerable to other sovereigns. As the United
States begins to transfer many of its detainees of varying citizenship over to
the Afghan government, it is possible that conflicts with Afghanistan could
arise even for non-citizens. This is a factor that has been in the background
of both Boumediene and Al Maqaleh I, yet it is of growing concern as ten-
sions mount as the United States begins to transfer control of the prison to
Afghanistan. In March of 2012, President Barack Obama and President
Hamid Karzai signed a Memorandum of Understanding that the prison at
Bagram Air Base would be transferred to Afghan control.196 Yet, in Novem-
ber of 2012, America had not yet given over control to the Afghan govern-
ment.197 There are growing disputes between the two countries over
detention centers that would be intensified by a U.S. court reviewing the
cases, particularly over certain detainees captured before the Memoran-
dum of Understanding and new detainees captured after the signing of the
189. Id. at 229 (alterations in original) (citing Tennison Decl. ' 16).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 229-30.
193. Wazir v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d 63, 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
194. Id. at 64 (citing Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009)).
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).
196. Rod Nordland, Karzai Orders Afghan Forces to Take Control of American-Built
Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2012, at A4.
197. Id.
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Memorandum.198 The magnitude of this problem continues to grow as
Americans detain approximately one hundred new insurgents each
month.199 Thus, even non-Afghan citizens have come to cause conflicts
with the host government, with the winding down of the American pres-
ence in Afghanistan and the transfer of prisoners to the Afghan
government.
3. Length of Detention
The length of detention has become a recurring theme throughout
Boumediene and the cases that followed. In his concurrence in Boumediene,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Souter expressed concern
over the length of detention for the detainees. 200 The emphasis on the
length of detention in Souter's concurrences suggests that the length of
detention should be considered a factor in the Boumediene analysis. 2 0 1
Because some of the petitioners had been detained for six years by the time
Boumediene was decided, Souter observed that the "decision is no judicial
victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, and the
obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to
prisoners and to the Nation."202
In Al Maqaleh I, Judge Bates viewed the length of detention as a sev-
enth factor influencing the other factors in the Boumediene analysis. 203
Though he did not consider it entirely a separate factor, he stated that it
would "shade" the other factors. 204 The petitioners in both Boumediene
and Al Maqaleh were detained for six years before the courts considered
their cases. 2 0 5 As those detained during the war on terror stay in custody
for even greater lengths of time, their access to the courts becomes even
more essential and will likely weigh on the justices in deciding whether the
length of detention should become an additional factor.
4. Age
In October of 2012, the D.C. District Court, in Hamidullah v. Obama,
dismissed a petition of a Pakistani citizen held at Bagram Airbase under the
holding of Al Maqaleh 11.206 Hamidullah argued that he was since he was
fourteen at the time he was captured, he should be entitled to habeus
corpus protections; however, the court found that age did not affect the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 799 (Souter, J., concurring).
201. Richard Nicholson, Note, Functionalism's Military Necessity Problem: Extraterri-
torial Habeas Corpus, Justice Kennedy, Boumediene v. Bush, and Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 81
FoRDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1443 (2012).
202. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801 (Souter, J., concurring).
203. Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (D.D.C. 2009).
204. Id. at 217.
205. Id. at 216.
206. Hamidullah v. Obama, No. 10-758 (JDB), 2012 WL 5077127, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
19, 2012).
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scope of the Suspension Clause.207 According to the court, Hamidullah
had not sufficiently proven that habeas corpus protections for juveniles
"[are] somewhat more robust than the concomitant right among adults."208
The court was dismissive of Hamidullah's claim that the habeas
corpus right for juveniles is more robust historically.209 Hamidullah first
asserted that habeas corpus was used in the early days of the United States
to free "underage soldiers from detention by their commanding officers,"
and were "brought by juveniles in 'a wide variety of child-detention
regimes, ranging from work apprenticeships to formal slavery.' 210 The
court refuted this claim by asserting that the mere fact that juveniles had
the right to petition for habeas corpus did not make the right more
robust.211 Hamidullah next asserted that, historically, "courts exercised
an unusual form of discretion in habeas petitions filed on behalf of
juveniles; although they were obligated to free the juvenile from improper
restraint, they could choose the best person to take custody thereafter."2 12
The court similarly dismissed this claim as not creating "more robust"
rights for juveniles.213 Hamidullah also cited to cases where courts could
"issue the writ to an in-state 'jailer' even when the child was located else-
where."214 However, the court dismissed this argument, indicating that a
court's authority to issue the writ to an in-state "jailer" also existed in adult
cases.215 Finally, Hamidullah claimed that early English judges often con-
ducted factual discoveries for cases involving children, more frequently
than they did in other cases. 216 Again, the court did not find this argu-
ment persuasive. 217
However, the court looked more seriously to whether the reference to
the "status of the detainee" in the first factor outlined by Boumediene
included a consideration of "juvenile status."218 In Boumediene and Al
Maqaleh II, this was discussed purely in the context of "enemy" designation
for detainees. 219 Despite evidence that in many settings "juvenile" was a
relevant aspect of "status," the Hamidullah court found that this was not
relevant to the right of habeas corpus. 220 Because there were not specific
instances where courts cited a "juvenile" status, the court was unwilling to
include it as a factor. 221 Indeed, the court rejected "juvenile" despite the
fact that neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever stated
207. Id. at *3.
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that classification as an "enemy" was the only relevant classification. 222
However, the court did state that if age were a relevant factor, it weighed in
favor of the juvenile's entitlement to the writ.22 3
Despite the court's determination, there are strong policy reasons for
using age as a factor for the Boumediene analysis when the petitioner is a
juvenile or was at the time of his or her capture. Some of the same policy
reasons for why children are afforded extra protections in criminal settings
also are relevant to the Boumediene analysis. For example, since juveniles
are more susceptible to coercion, the Supreme Court has held that children
are entitled to greater protections in Miranda cases. 224 The concerns
about coercion are also applicable in habeas corpus cases, particularly
because juveniles are not granted any extra protections in the status deter-
mination process. If there were additional process in the combatant deter-
mination, this might mitigate the relevance of the age factor in the
Boumediene analysis, but that was not the case in Hamidullah. Further, the
international community has recognized similar principles. For example,
The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with
Armed Forces or Armed Groups states that "[c]hildren who are accused of
crimes under international law allegedly committed while they were associ-
ated with armed forces or armed groups should be considered primarily as
victims of offences against international law; not only as perpetrators."225
Recent news reports state that the United States has informed the
United Nations that they have detained more than two hundred Afghan
teenagers as enemy combatants since 2008.226 A recent visit by Human
Rights Watch to Bagram Airbase in March 2012 revealed that the United
States held 250 juveniles under the age of eighteen.227 Only juveniles
under the age of sixteen were held separately; seventeen and eighteen year-
olds were held with the adult population.228 Additionally, the review pro-
cess for juveniles was identical to the process for adults: a Detainee Review
Board assessed detained juveniles sixty days after their capture, and then at
six-month intervals. 229 Juvenile detainees, like adult detainees, did not
have access to attorneys or to the evidence that the Review Board used. 230
Likewise, the same rationale might apply to enemy combatants who are
determined to have an intellectual disability or severe mental health issues.
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Conclusion
The formalistic application of the Boumediene factors in recent cases,
particularly in Al Maqaleh II, has defeated the functional analysis present
throughout the line of cases that ultimately led to Boumediene. This funda-
mental flaw in the current regime fails to adequately preserve the function-
alist approach that the Court embodied in Boumediene and the cases that
led up to it. Factors such as executive manipulation, conflicts with host
governments, length of detention, and age should be considerations for the
court, as they would better serve the policies behind the habeas corpus
precedent leading up to and embodied in Boumediene.
The formalistic application of Boumediene jeopardizes a regime that
was intended to balance the importance of the Great Writ, the individual's
rights, and the needs of the military, yet it fails to do this. The factors
suggested by this Note weigh differently, some tend to support individual
rights, while some tend to support the governmental interest. But the con-
sistent theme throughout these additional factors is that the formalistic
application of the Boumediene factors presents an incomplete picture. The
three factors underdetermine how the Court should approach these cases
to strike a more equitable result that will ultimately better serve the United
States and our Constitution.
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